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Since 1982, the cost of employer-provided health insurance net of inflation has risen over 
150%.  Over that same period, there has been a decrease in marginal income tax rates.  
Both trends would induce firms to reduce the generosity of their health insurance benefits 
or to drop them altogether. Consistent with the theory, empirical results show that firms 
are more likely to provide health insurance benefits in states with high marginal income 
tax rates and low insurance costs. The combined effects of the large increases in health 
insurance costs and the reductions in marginal income tax rates were a 10-percentage 
point reduction in the probability of receiving employer-provided health insurance 
benefits.  The decrease in benefits lowered average hours of labor supply by 4-7%.Labor Market Implications of Rising Costs of Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
 
Benefits have become an increasingly large share of compensation packages, 
representing nearly 30 percent of total compensation at large firms.  Other than legally required 
employer contributions for social security, worker's compensation and unemployment insurance, 
health insurance represents the largest average benefit outlay, averaging $3,078 per full time 
employee or about 7 percent of total compensation.  The real cost of providing this benefit per 
hour worked has risen over 150 percent since 1982.
1  As the costs of providing the benefit have 
risen, the proportion of full-time employees covered by employer-paid health insurance has 
fallen by 12 percentage points and the proportion of covered part-year workers has fallen even 
more.  In the firms that retained benefits, the share of insurance costs borne by employees rose 
and the proportion offering benefits to dependents of employees fell.
2  Because over 90% of the 
privately insured in the U.S. have plans through an employer, the decreasing proportion of 
employees receiving paid benefits through their employer has contributed to the decrease in the 
proportion of U.S. residents with insurance.
3 
Lettau and Buchmueller (1999) report that 86 percent of full-time workers, but only 24 
percent of part-time workers, receive firm-provided health insurance benefits.  In practice, 
workers face one wage schedule if they work part-time and another wage schedule plus a 
discrete benefit level if they work full-time.  This nonlinear convex relationship between total 
compensation and hours of work can be used by firms to induce some workers to accept longer 
hours of work.  This study proposes that firms offer contracts that specify work hours, wages, 
and benefit levels so as to maximize profits, given the cost of offering each of these three 
elements of the contract.  The rapid increase in the cost of offering health benefits relative to 
wages will affect all three elements of the contract.   2
Previous research has examined various aspects of the interrelationship between wages, 
benefits and work hours.  One strand of research has concentrated on establishing the 
relationship between health insurance benefits and labor supply behavior, particularly with 
respect to retirement decisions and job mobility.
4  Johnson, Davidoff and Perese (2003), for 
example, show that workers who face the largest increases in health insurance premia upon 
retirement significantly delay their exit from the labor force.  Results can be sensitive to controls 
for the potential endogeneity of benefit provision.  Gilleskie and Lutz (2002) found that evidence 
of job-lock weakens when controlling for joint decisions on benefit provision and job switching. 
Other studies have examined how provision of fringe benefits affect a firm’s decision on 
hours of work.  Scott, Berger and Black (1989) and Montgomery and Cosgrove (1993) reported 
that fringe benefit provision reduces the use of part-time workers, although they caution that the 
treatment of benefits as exogenous may bias their results.  Similarly, Cutler and Madrian (1998) 
found that rising health insurance costs led to increased hours of work in firms that offered 
benefits compared to firms that did not.  
Several studies have examined how firm provision of health insurance benefits changes 
in response to changing tax treatment of benefits or other factors that would affect the relative 
cost of providing benefits versus wages.  Gruber and Lettau (2000), Royalty (2000) and 
Thomasson (2003) show that tax preferences for health insurance have increased firm incentives 
to provide benefits. 
Cutler (1994) found that there is substantial variation in health insurance costs across 
firms as well as across time periods.  The recent period of rising health insurance costs 
corresponds to erosion of the level of firm benefits (Gruber (2000), but there is little direct 
information on the impact of health insurance prices on probability of firm benefit provision.  A   3
recent exception is Kaestner and Simon (2002) who demonstrated that state-level insurance 
reforms that raised insurance costs resulted in a decrease in firm provision of benefits. 
Another strand of research has looked at worker acceptance or rejection of benefits 
offered by employers.  Farber and Levy (2000) found that much of the decline in employer 
provision of benefits is caused by workers refusing the offer of health insurance.  While half of 
the decrease in acceptance is due to workers receiving benefits through a spouse’s employment, 
the rest of the decline in take-up is presumably related to decreases in the quality of benefits 
offered by firms and/or increases in the employee’s required contribution.  In a study of data 
from a single firm, Royalty and Solomon (1999) found that employee health plan choices were 
quite sensitive to the required co-payment price. 
Finally, several studies have explored the interaction between wages and health insurance 
benefits. Currie and Madrian (1999) found that most studies fail to find that wages and health 
insurance benefits are inversely related as one would expect from the theory of compensating 
differentials.  The common explanation is that unobserved ability raises both wages and benefits, 
although researchers have been able to find inverse relationships between wages and other 
benefits.
5  A recent exception is Olson(2002) who found evidence of an inverse relationship 
between wages and health insurance earned by wives when husband’s health insurance, union 
status and firm size are used as instruments for their wife’s probability of receiving health 
insurance benefits from her employer.
6 
This study integrates these various strands of research by treating all three key variables 
(wages, hours, and health insurance benefits) as jointly determined.  This allows firms to respond 
to rising health insurance costs by altering their benefit level, their wages, or their hours of work.  
Past studies in other contexts such as overtime (Trejo, 2003) or maternity benefits (Gruber, 1994)   4
have shown that wage reductions can fully absorb the costs of increased benefits, so it is 
conceivable that firm responses to rising health insurance costs are limited to wage adjustments 
with no hours or benefit reactions.  However, there is a strong prima facie case that at least some 
firms responded to the rising insurance costs by altering the quality of their offered benefits or 
else dropping the benefits completely.  Changes in either benefit or wage levels would be 
expected to affect work incentives of their employees.  By treating wages, benefits and hours as 
simultaneously determined, we do not limit the range of firm responses to the rising insurance 
costs. 
This study makes use of Current Population Survey data for various years between 1983 
and 1995, a period that includes the period of the most rapid increases in health insurance costs.
7  
The choice of years is dictated by the availability of health insurance prices for a constant quality 
of coverage.  The study concentrates on a sample of single workers to avoid complications 
caused by a worker’s choices being affected by a spouse’s benefits and hours decisions.  
Presumably reflecting their more limited alternative sources of health insurance, past studies 
have shown that single workers are more sensitive to benefit levels (Gilleskie and Lutz, 2002).  
In contrast, prime-aged males that have been the focus of many previous studies of hours 
responses to health insurance have very inelastic labor supply responses that may not reflect the 
supply response to changes in compensation for the labor force as a whole.  In particular, prime-
aged males are about one-third as likely to work part-time as similarly aged women (Rones, Ilg 
and Gardner, 1997), and it is in the shift from full-time to part-time work that one might expect 
to see the biggest supply response to changes in employer-provided insurance benefits or wages.  
The empirical work demonstrates that the probability of receiving health insurance 
through one's employer is significantly affected by insurance costs and income tax rates.  Hours   5
of labor supply are strongly positively influenced by the probability of receiving benefits and by 
the level of those benefits.  Rising insurance costs and falling marginal income tax rates over the 
sample period can fully explain the observed reduction in the probability of receiving employer-
provided health insurance between 1983 and 1995.  In contrast, real wages were unresponsive to 
changes in insurance costs, although they did fall in response to declining marginal income tax 
rates.  The reduction in health insurance benefits led to a 4-7% reduction in average hours 
worked. 
I.  Stylized Facts Regarding Employer Contributions to Health Insurance 
Insurance premiums rose rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s.  As shown in Table 1, 
correcting for inflation, the average cost to community hospitals of a one-day stay plus services 
rose 124 % from 1983 to 1995. Cross sectional variation in insurance rates are closely tied to the 
cross-sectional information on daily hospital costs.
8   
In apparent response to this dramatic increase in the cost of providing health insurance 
benefits, firms cut back on benefit provision.  The proportion of single workers covered by 
employer-provided health insurance fell from 71% to 61%.
9  Average real employer 
contributions only rose 24% over the period, so employer contributions fell considerably short of 
the 124% increase in premium costs.  Looking only at employees who continued to pay at least 
partial benefits over the period, employer expenditures rose only 88% compared to the increase 
in prices of 124%.  The implication is that not only did many employers stop offering health 
insurance benefits, but that the quality of health insurance benefits offered also fell, a likely 
factor in the decrease in the take-up rate for benefits offered by employers.   
As discussed by Cutler and Madrian (1998), average cost of benefits cannot be used as a 
measure of the price of insurance because the expenditures are the product of exogenous prices   6
and endogenous benefit quality.  This is evident in Table 1: the time path of employer health 
insurance expenditures per worker understates the actual increase in the price of health insurance 
by 36 percentage points.  This implies that the firms that have contiunued to offer benefits have 
cut back significantly on the quality of benefits provided.  
Firm decisions regarding health insurance may have also been influenced by income tax 
reforms.  Over the sample period, average state income tax rates rose 44%, but marginal tax rates 
fell by 25%.  Because insurance benefits are untaxed, firms are more likely to provide benefits in 
states or years with high income tax rates.  Previous studies suggest that these changes in average 
and marginal tax rates could have substantial effects on firm incentives to provide health 
insurance benefits. 
The results in Table 1 highlight why previous conclusions regarding the impact of health 
insurance costs on hours worked may be biased.  Firms have either dropped benefits or reduced 
the quality of offered benefits in response to economic incentives, so benefits must be treated as 
an endogenous choice. 
II.  Employer and Employee Incentives Regarding Health Insurance  
  In this section we present a simple theoretical model that illustrates how firms jointly 
choose hours, wages and benefit levels so as to maximize profits.  The treatment extends the 
model of Cutler and Madrian (1998) to the case where wages and benefits are endogenous. 
A.  The Employer’s Tradeoff 
  Firms have several reasons why they may want to provide health insurance benefits to 
their employees.  One is that firms almost certainly can obtain more favorable terms in acquiring 
health insurance than can their employees.  Thus, by offering the benefit rather than a similar 
dollar amount of wages, the firm may be able to raise worker utility without adding   7
compensation cost.  There are two main reasons why employers can access health insurance at a 
lower cost than can individual workers.  First, employers can bundle many health insurance 
policies into one.  Insurance companies are willing to cut the price of a pooled policy because of 
the lower cost of providing multiple clients the same menu of services.  Firm costs of purchasing 
health insurance are also lower because of the favorable tax treatment given to benefits versus 
wages.  A worker who buys an insurance policy must pay with after-tax earnings.  Thus, if a 
worker earns $W in wages which he uses to purchase health insurance, he will only have 
$W(1-t) left to purchase the insurance policy, where t < 1 is the marginal income tax rate.  If 
instead, the firm pays the same amount in compensation but in the form of a health insurance 
benefit, the worker receives $W of the insurance benefit. 
  Our interest is to illustrate why firms may make different choices regarding the mix of 
wages and benefits to offer their employees.  A likely candidate is variation in health insurance 
costs and income tax rates across states.  However, it is also likely that workers supply of hours 
or effort will be influenced by the levels of wages and benefits.  Consequently, the firm’s profit 
maximizing compensation decisions will reflect the firm’s beliefs about worker labor supply 
behavior. 
  For the firm to attract workers, it must offer a compensation package that at least meets a 
worker’s opportunity wage at other firms,  (Z) U .  Z is an index of skill such that  0 UZ > .  The 
firm’s wage, W, health insurance benefit, B, and work hours, h, must satisfy 
h), B, t), U(W(1 (Z) U − <  where UW > 0, UB > 0, and Uh < 0, and where t is the tax rate. 
  This implies that for workers of a given skill level Z, and other attributes X, a firm will 
face a supply schedule of hours that their employers are willing to work.  The supply schedule is 
given by   8
  X) Z, B; t)W, h((1 h − =  (1) 
where hW > 0, hWW < 0, hB > 0, hBB < 0.  Equation (1) implies that the firm can induce more 
hours from its workers of a given skill level by raising the after-tax wage rate, (1-t)W, or by 
raising health insurance benefits, B.  However, it becomes more expensive to increase hours of 
work by raising compensation as the levels of W and B increase.
10 
  Given (1), the firm is assumed to choose an employment and compensation mix that 
maximizes profit.  The firm’s profit maximization problem, treating the output price as 
numeraire, can be written 
   B) C N(Wh f(Nh) max
B
B W, N, + − = π  (2) 
where C
B is the cost of obtaining a health insurance policy for an employee. 
  The firm chooses N directly but sets h implicitly by its choices of W and B.  The firm’s 
short-run production function  ) f(• , depends on the total hours of labor employed.
11  The 
production function is assumed to be concave in the labor input. 
  Inserting (1) into (2) and taking the first order conditions, we obtain 
   0 B) C (wh f h
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Condition (3B) can be arranged as 
   W W t)Wh (1 h f t)h (1 − + = ′ −  (4) 
  This means that the firm will raise wages to the point where the revenue from the induced 
increase in hours supplied equals the cost of the increased hours plus the cost of raising the wage   9
for the h hours the firm had already induced.  Notice that for each dollar increase in wages, the 
employees only respond to $(1-t), their after-tax share.
12 
  In a similar manner, condition (3C) implies that 
   B
B
B Wh C f h + = ′  (5) 
Here, the firm will raise benefit levels until the gain in revenue from induced increased labor is 
equal to the cost of raising the benefit.  The latter includes both the direct cost of raising B plus 
the increased wage bill from the induced increase in hours worked. 










=    (6) 
The firm’s decision of how to divide compensation between wages versus health insurance 
benefits will depend on the relative cost of raising each form of compensation and their relative 
impacts on labor supply.  As current hours increase or as the tax rate increases, it becomes more 
expensive to raise compensation through a wage increase rather than an increase in benefits.  
Conversely, higher insurance costs make it more attractive to increase compensation through a 
wage increase. 
  Equation (6) has two important implications.  First, it illustrates why incentives to offer 
health insurance rise as hours worked increase, consistent with the large difference between full 
and part-time workers in the receipt of insurance benefits.  Second, the firm’s decision on the 
level of wages or benefits will depend on relative costs of offering the two forms of 
compensation, suggesting that tax rates and insurance costs will be useful instruments to identify 
endogenous firm compensation decisions.   10
  The first-order condition (3A) implies that the firm will hire workers until the revenue 
generated from the last worker equals the anticipated cost of total compensation.  Additional 
insights can be obtained by inserting (3B) and (3C) into (3A) to generate 
   () W) f ( Bh t)Wh (1 f h B W − ′ + − = ′   














W E  is the elasticity of hours supplied with respect to wages and 
h
B E  is the elasticity of 
hours supplied with respect to the insurance benefit.  The standard condition for a firm that takes 
wages as given exogenously is  W. f = ′   As f′ approaches W on the left-hand-side, the right-
hand-side becomes infinitely large.  This is consistent with a perfectly elastic labor supply curve 
at the market-determined wage, so that  ∞ →
h
W E  and/or  ∞ →
h
B E  as assumed for a firm in a 
perfectly competitive labor market.  If the hours elasticities with respect to benefits and with 
respect to wages are of finite size, however, then the firm will set wages and benefits 
endogenously, and we will need to use instruments to identify the impact of wages and benefits 
on hours of work.  
B.  Full-time versus Part-time Contracts 
  Because an individual faces rising disutility from hours of work as hours increase, a 
convex compensation mechanism would be more efficient at inducing additional hours of work.  
Equation (6) suggests that the firm will increase benefits as hours supplied become less sensitive 
to wage increases.  However, benefits may also be used to create the convex compensation 
mechanism needed to induce additional labor supply as h increases.  This happens when firms 
offer health benefits only to their full-time workers but not to their part-time workers.  As   11
reported by Currie and Yelowitz (2000), this is a common practice.  In 1994, 74% of 
establishments had minimum hours requirements to qualify for health insurance benefits.
13 
Figure 1 shows the budget constraint from the perspective of a firm offering part-time 
and full-time jobs to a worker.  The worker could earn the wages WNB if he receives no benefits.  
However, after H
* hours of work, the firm provides a benefits package that shifts the budget 
constraint upward.  Because it is providing benefits, the firm can lower hourly wages and still 
meet the reservation utility condition, so the wage it pays with benefits satisfies WB < WNB. 
  Workers facing the choice of how many hours to work look at the after-tax reward 
structure.  These choices are illustrated in Figure 2.  When an individual is faced with the 
compensation package that has no health benefit, he would opt for the part-time job and earn 
t) (1 W H NB 0 − .  However, when the alternative contract is offered with health insurance benefits 
added after a minimum of H
* hours, this worker is induced to work full time at compensation 
level B   t) (1 W H B
* + − . 
  For workers who would already be beyond H
* when faced with the wage only contract, 
say, at hours level H1, the health benefit contract would induce a reduction in hours worked.  For 
such workers, the health insurance benefit induces both an income and a substitution effect away 
from hours worked.  Knowing this, firms will want to set the minimum hours necessary to obtain 
the health benefit at the upper-tail of the distribution of hours worked under the wage only 
contract, reinforcing the implication of equation (6) that firms will increasingly use benefits at 
higher levels of hours.
14 
  By offering two compensation options with and without benefits conditional on hours 
worked, the firm induces workers to self-sort in full- or part-time jobs.  This is the sorting result 
first shown by Scott, Berger and Black (1989).  Our contribution is to emphasize that changes in   12
insurance prices and tax rates will shift the wage and benefit levels which will in turn alter the 
incentives for workers to accept one compensation alternative relative to the other. 
  Of greatest interest to us is what would make the worker switch back to H0 if he were at 
H
*.  The choice to switch would depend on the generosity of the benefit plan, as indicated by the 
height of the parallel shift upward in the budget constraint at H*.  If the firm cuts back on the 
generosity of the plan, the height of the shift decreases, and eventually the worker will opt not to 
take-up the offered benefits.  It is that mechanism that we propose underlies the drop in take-up 
in the face of the cuts in the average quality of employer-provided benefits in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
 III.  Empirical Strategy 
  Our aim is to estimate labor supply equations of the form 
   τ) P, t), V(1 B, t), h(W(1 h − − =  (8) 
where W, t and B are defined above, V is a nonlabor income, P is a price index and τ is an index 
for value of time in nonmarket activities.  In principle, equations such as (8) can be estimated if 
wages and benefits are exogenous.  However, it is virtually certain, given our discussion above, 
that the firm's level of wages and benefits will be chosen jointly with hours worked.  
Consequently, we need to be able to derive instruments for W and B. 
  Equation (6) suggests that plausible instruments for W and B can be derived from state 
income tax rates, t
S, and measures of the cost of offering benefits relative to wages.  Royalty has 
shown that state-level income tax rates can serve as effective instruments for firm health 
insurance benefits.  In addition to the direct cost of health insurance, C
B, local labor market 
conditions, L, will affect the relative cost of benefits.  High earnings states will be exposed to 
higher federal marginal tax rates which may make untaxed nonwage compensation more   13
attractive.  Firms with more cyclical labor demand or high turnover may find it more expensive 
to provide benefits with significant fixed costs such as health insurance.  Similarly, unionized 
firms may face lower benefit costs because of lower turnover, shared administrative costs 
between the union and the firm, or shared costs of negotiating for better insurance premiums. 
Wage and benefit levels will also reflect the workers level of skill, Z. 
  The instrumenting equations will be of the form 
  
Z) L, , ,C (t B






Our strategy is to use (9) to identify W and B in (8), yielding unbiased estimates of the supply 
responses to W and B. 
  There is another reason to opt for an instrumental variables strategy to identify health 
insurance benefits and wages, even if these forms of compensation could be considered 
exogenously determined.  Berger, Black and Scott (1998) found that employees and employers 
disagree on the level and incidence of health insurance coverage provided by the employer.  
They found that when the CPS measure of health insurance is used as an explanatory variable, its 
coefficient is significantly biased toward zero.  This suggests that earlier estimates of health 
insurance effects on hours of work may be too small.  Blundell and MaCurdy (1999, pp.1622-
1625) argue that instrumental variables can serve as a robust method to correct for both 
endogeneity and measurement error in the analysis of tax effects or other nonlinear budget 
constraints on labor supply.  Consequently, the same mechanism used to correct for possible 
endogeneity in (9) can also serve as an instrumental variables mechanism to correct for 
measurement error in observed health insurance benefits. 
IV.  Data   14
  The primary data set is based on the 1983, 1987, 1991, and 1995 editions of the March 
Current Population Surveys (CPS).  The years were selected to span a period when the cost of 
health insurance was rising rapidly relative to the consumer price index (Glied, 2003).  The 
specific years used correspond to the years when the Health Insurance Association of America 
released public use information on hospital costs by state.   
  The analysis concentrates on single workers aged 25 to 60.  By concentrating on single 
workers, we are able to avoid complications caused by one spouse’s labor supply responses to 
offered compensation being affected by their spouse’s compensation and hours decisions.  As 
shown by Farber and Levy (2000), half of the decline in benefit take-up is attributable to spouse 
benefits.  With single workers, we have a one-to-one correspondence between the wage and 
health benefits offered by the firm and the decisions made by the worker as required by the 
theory.  In addition Dranove, Spier and Baker (2000) argue that firms modify benefit packages to 
attempt to induce employees to opt for their spouse’s benefit package, a problem not at issue for 
single workers. 
  Our sample excludes individuals classified as students, disabled or retired.  The self-
employed were excluded because of measurement problems in determining compensation terms 
for those who employ themselves and set their own hours.  Individuals who did not work at all 
the previous year were excluded because of the absence of information on hours, wages or 
benefits.  The selection problem is not likely to be serious, as 94 percent of singles in the age 
range held at least one job in the previous year. It is possible that some individuals self-select 
into unemployment because of the existence of publicly-provided health insurance benefits.  
Gruber (2003) argues that the large number of persons eligible for public insurance who choose 
employer-provided insurance instead suggests that employer-provided insurance is a dominant   15
good, implying that individuals would not voluntarily select the inferior state.  The final sample 
consists of 27,564 individuals spread over the four years. 
  Another advantage of the sample of individuals over samples of prime-aged males that 
have been commonly used in earlier studies of worker responses to health insurance is that 
sample distributions of single workers closely mimic the range of hours worked and health 
insurance benefits received in the labor force as a whole.  The distributions of benefits received 
and hours worked are reported in Table 2.  The proportion of single workers receiving employer-
provided benefits is virtually identical to the proportion of all workers aged 25-64 receiving own 
employer-provided benefits reported by Currie and Yelowitz (2000).  Their estimates for 1987, 
1991 and 1995 were 68%, 61% and 62%, compared to our corresponding estimates for single 
workers of 68%, 62% and 61%.  In contrast, Lettau and Buchmueller (1999) reported that 84% 
of prime-aged males receive employer-provided health insurance benefits over the sample 
period.    
  The hours distribution for single workers also matches nearly exactly the distribution of 
work hours for the labor market as a whole.  Whereas 25.7% of single workers work part-time, 
the corresponding proportion in the overall labor force is 24% (Rones, Ilg and Gardner (1997)).  
In contrast, the proportion of prime-age males working part-time is typically below 10%.  Single 
workers were somewhat more likely to work 35-39 hours per week and somewhat less likely to 
work over 41 hours, but the differences are small.  Because the decisions of single workers 
should closely match the theoretical model and because they mimic the range of hours and 
benefits observed in the labor market as a whole, they should yield labor supply responses to 
rising health insurance costs that are more representative of the labor market as a whole.   16
A.  Endogenous Variables 
  Summary information on the variables and their empirical definitions are included in 
Table 3.  Hours worked is measured by multiplying weeks worked last year by usual hours 
worked per week in the CPS.  Wages are measured by weeks worked last year times average 
weekly earnings, divided by annual hours of wage work.  Two measures of employer provided 
health insurance are available.  The first is a continuous measure of the dollar amount of the 
employer’s contribution to health insurance.  The alternative measure is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the employer contributes to health insurance.  The value of the dichotomous 
measure as opposed to the dollar amount of the benefit is that it may be the existence of the 
discontinuity as opposed to changes in the marginal value of the benefit that affect labor supply. 
B.  Exogenous Variables 
  The key identifying variables in the wage and benefit equations include measures of the 
price of health insurance, state tax rates, and local labor market conditions.  The price of health 
insurance is based on the average daily cost per patient in community hospitals, reported by state 
in the Source Book of Health Insurance Data.  This data was supplemented by estimates of the 
ratio of metropolitan to nonmetropolitan health care costs by state which was provided to us by a 
national insurance company.  The latter data allow us to introduce variation in health insurance 
costs across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas within a state. 
 Let  C




m/C C r =  be the ratio of 
metropolitan to nonmetropolitan health insurance cost in the state.  Let  m α  be the share of the 
state’s population that resides in a metropolitan area.  Then 
  
) α 1 r (α C
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The metropolitan and nonmetropolitan health insurance costs can be derived from information on 
C
B, r and  m α  using 
  












We make use of two measures of the state's income tax level.  The first is the average state 
income tax rate.  The second is the summed average of the federal and state marginal income tax 
rates.  Information on average state tax income rates and the marginal federal and state income 
tax rates have been appended to the CPS data by Unicon Research Corporation. 
  The variables used to describe local labor market conditions include the employment 
growth rate, the unemployment rate, the average non-supervisory manufacturing wage and union 
coverage.  Tight labor market conditions, resulting from a strong economy, should have a 
positive effect on labor demand.  On the other hand, firms in unstable labor markets with high 
probability of unemployment may want to avoid compensation packages with high fixed costs. 
  The log of the state average non-manufacturing wage is used as an indicator of local 
wage competition that should have a positive effect on both forms of competition.  In addition, 
states with high average incomes will have higher tax rates on average, which may give an added 
reason for firms to offer benefits.  Numerous studies have shown that unionized workers receive 
higher wages and benefits (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
  The remainder of the variables includes measures of skill, living costs and geographic 
variables.  Measures of skill include linear and quadratic terms in experience and education.
15  
The effects of these variables should be similar, whether compensation is measured in wages or 
benefits.  Following Mincer (1974) these measures of human capital are expected to have a 
positive but diminishing marginal effect on wages.  Changes in the cost of living over time are   18
captured by changes in the consumer price index.  Cross-sectional variation in living costs is 
controlled by measures of land prices in the state and a series of dummy variables indicating 
region of the country and metropolitan residence.  The rest of the variables in the wage and 
benefit equations include dummy variables indicating gender and race. 
  Following the specification suggested by equation (8), the independent variables used in 
the labor supply equation include the instrumented measures of employer-provided health 
insurance and hourly wage rates less taxes.  Nonlabor income is measured by taxable income 
minus earned income.  This was multiplied by one minus the average tax rate to generate 
household non-wage income less taxes. 
  Controls for the value of nonmarket time, τ, in equation (8) include measures of skill and 
individual and household demographics.  In addition to those used in the compensation 
equations, we include measures of the number of persons in the household and the number of 
children under six. 
  The remaining geographic and price variables are the same as those in the compensation 
equations.  These measures are included to correct for changes in the purchasing power of wages 
and income over time and across areas of the country. 
V.  Estimation 
  The theory suggests that equations (8) and (9) can be approximated by a system of 
equations of the form 
   h τ P v B w e τβ Pβ t) lnV(1 β g(B) β t) lnW(1 β lnh + + + − + + − =  (11a) 




t e Zγ Lγ lnC γ lnt γ lnW + + + + =  (11b) 




t e Zδ Lδ lnC δ lnt S g(B) + + + + =  (11c)   19
where P is a vector of cost of living measures, τ is a vector of indicators of the value of 
nonmarket time, L is a vector of local labor market variables, and Z is a vector of skills.  Where 
possible, variables are transformed into logarithmic form so that their associated coefficients can 
be interpreted as elasticities. 
  Efficiency suggests estimating (11a-c) jointly, imposing the restrictions implied by wage 
and benefit equations on the hours equation.  The nature of the benefits data complicates that 
strategy.  Because 35 percent of the employees in the sample receive no firm-provided health 
benefits, B could be measured as a dummy variable.  One option is a two-stage procedure 
estimating (11c) using probit and (11b) using least-squares in the first stage.  Predicted values 
from the first-stage are inserted into (11a) in the second stage.  While this would yield consistent 
estimates of the parameters, the standard errors would be biased.  Bootstrap methods can be used 
to generate correct standard errors for 11a. 
  A second strategy is to use the level rather than the presence or absence of employer 
contributions to health insurance.  It is convenient to transform the benefits measure into natural 
logarithms, so we added $1 to every observed benefit to eliminate the problem of taking logs of 
zero values.  We can then estimate equations (11a-c) as a system and impose restrictions across 
equations.  We discuss the results of each of these estimation strategies in turn. 
VI.  Results 
  The estimates with employer-provided health insurance measured as a dichotomous 
variable are reported in Table 4.  The first two columns report the compensation equations.  Both 
wages and benefits rise with skill.  At sample means, wages rise 14 percent per year of 
experience and 12.3 percent per added level of educational attainment.  The corresponding 
impacts on the probability of getting employer-provided health insurance are 0.7 percent per year   20
of experience and 5.5 percent per added education level.
16  Both wages and benefits are higher 
for whites, union members, and those who live in metropolitan areas.  Single women face an 8 
percent lower wage on average than comparably skilled men but are 4.7 percent more likely to 
receive health insurance benefits.  Workers in the Midwest are more likely to receive health 
insurance but face lower wages than do comparably skilled workers elsewhere.  Measures of 
local labor market conditions have little impact on wages, but areas with higher average earnings 
and rising employment are significantly more likely to receive employer provided health 
insurance.  This suggests that benefits more than wages are used to attract or retain workers as 
labor markets tighten. 
  Our primary interest are the effects of state taxes and insurance costs on wage and benefit 
offers.  Firms in states and metropolitan areas facing higher insurance costs were significantly 
less likely to offer benefits.  The implied elasticity is -0.07, so a ten percent increase in health 
insurance cost lowers the probability of receiving benefits by 0.7 percent.  In addition, both 
higher state average and marginal income tax rates led to a higher probability of firms offering 
health insurance benefits.  Evaluated at sample means, the elasticity of the probability of 
receiving benefits were 0.01 with respect to average income tax rates and 0.34 with respect to 
marginal rates.  This implies that marginal tax rates are more important than average tax rates in 
affecting the decision of whether to offer health insurance benefits.  Our elasticities are 
consistent with those reported in previous studies using other samples of workers.
17  
  Wages increase in response to increases in the price of insurance, as would be expected if 
firms trade off wages and benefits.  However, the estimate is very small and imprecise.  It is 
clear that firms do absorb little of the rising cost of health insurance by cutting back on wages.  
Higher tax levels did raise the wages that firms had to pay.  The positive impact of income taxes   21
on wages suggests that some of the incidence of the income tax is shifted from workers to firms.  
The larger and more significant effect is for marginal tax rates—a unit increase in average tax 
rates increases real wages by 0.2% while a unit increase in marginal tax rates raises real wages 
by 4%.  The 25% decrease in marginal tax rates over the sample period would decrease real 
wages by 19%, other things held constant.  Therefore, decreasing real wages over the period 
appear to have been driven more by falling marginal income tax rates rather than by rising health 
insurance prices. 
  The third and fourth columns contain estimates of the labor supply equation with and 
without controls for the endogeneity of wages and benefits.  While all parameters are reported 
for completeness, our discussion concentrates on the wage and benefit effects.  The results in 
column three are included to illustrate the impact of the instruments on the wage and benefit 
estimates.  In column 3, benefits raise hours worked, consistent with the theory and earlier 
results,
18 but wages decrease hours which is inconsistent with the reservation utility condition.  
This inconsistency disapears when controlling for endogeneity of wages and benefits. 
  The two-stage results in column 4 show that exogenous shifts in after-tax wages have a 
significant positive impact on hours worked with an elasticity of 0.11.  The benefit effect also 
becomes more positive.  The implied elasticity of work hours with respect to an increase in the 
probability of receiving benefits is 0.43.  Because most firms condition receipt of the insurance 
benefit on the number of hours worked, we can interpret the increase in probability of receiving 
benefits as an increased probability of a convex kink in the budget constraint.  These results 
suggest that the kink in the budget constraint created by the provision of health insurance 
benefits strongly increases the hours worked by single workers.   22
  We can use the parameter estimates to simulate the responses to the changes in health 
insurance costs and income tax rates.  The 124% increase in the real cost of health insurance led 
to an 8.4% decrease in the probability of receiving benefits.  This in turn caused a 3.4% decrease 
in hours of labor supply.  At the same time, average state income taxes rose 44% while marginal 
income tax rates fell 25%.  The combined impact of these tax changes was to lower the 
probability of receiving benefits by 8% and to lower hours worked by 3.4%.  Taken as a whole, 
the model's estimates imply that changes in tax rates and health insurance costs lowered the 
probability of receiving benefits by 10 percentage points between 1983 and 1995, equal to the 
observed reduction in the proportion of workers receiving employer-provided health insurance 
benefits over the period.  The decrease in provision of benefits led to a 7% reduction in average 
hours worked. 
  Table 5 presents the results from the simultaneous estimation of equations (11a-c).  The 
null hypothesis that the three equations are independent was easily rejected.  The correlation 
matrix of the residuals indicates that unobserved attributes that raise wages also raise benefits. 
Residuals from the benefit and hours equations are also positively correlated.  The wage and 
hours residuals are nearly uncorrelated.  Despite the difference in estimation methods used in 
Tables 4 and 5, the stories that emerge are quite similar.  Outcomes regarding how benefits and 
wages respond to measured skill, gender, minority status, residency status, business cycle, and 
union coverage are virtually identical across the tables. 
  The impacts of health insurance costs and taxes are also similar to those reported in Table 
4.  The effects on wages are virtually identical.  As before, firms do not appear to raise wages in 
response to increases in health insurance premiums.  As before, wage responses to increases in 
tax rates are much larger, particularly with respect to the marginal income tax rate.   23
  A ten percent increase in health insurance costs lowers the employer’s contribution to 
health insurance by 3.5 percent.  The elasticity is five times larger than the effect on the 
probability of receiving benefits in Table 4, so firms are more apt to decrease the level of health 
insurance benefits than to eliminate the benefit altogether.  The elasticities of employer 
contributions with respect to tax levels are also larger than in Table 4.  The elasticity of benefit 
level with respect to the average income tax rate is 0.09, while the implied elasticity with respect 
to marginal income tax rates is 2.16.  Raising the marginal tax rate by one percentage point 
increases employer contributions to health insurance by 12.8 percent. 
  Turning to the labor supply effects, we again report the estimates treating wages and 
benefits as exogenous in column 3.  As before, the wage effect on hours is estimated to be 
negative, contrary to the theory.  When we correct for endogeneity in column 4, we get results 
that are similar in sign and significance to those in Table 4, although the magnitudes of the 
effects change.  The elasticity of hours worked with respect to employer health insurance 
contributions is 0.04, one-tenth the size of the response to the probability of receiving benefits 
reported in Table 4.  Apparently, the kink in the budget constraint caused by the presence or 
absence of the benefit is more important in influencing labor supply decisions than a change in 
the level of the employer’s contribution.  A percentage change in the wage has an impact on 
hours worked roughly four times larger than that of a percentage change in the employer’s health 
insurance contribution.  Again, the sign of the wage effect reverses between columns 3 and 4 
with the theoretically consistent sign obtained when the endogeneity is controlled. 
  Over the sample period, the implied comparative static impacts of the changes in health 
insurance costs and income tax rates on employer contributions to health insurance are -43 and 
-50 percentage points, respectively.  Note that in Table 1, employer contributions rose 24%   24
compared to a 124% increase in the cost, suggesting that the decrease in real quality of benefits 
is roughly on par with the combined effects of changes in tax rates and benefit costs.  The 
corresponding implied changes in hours worked are -1.9% and -2.2%, respectively.  In total, the 
model projects that reductions in employer health insurance contributions induced by changes in 
insurance premiums and tax rates led to a 4.1% decrease in hours worked. 
VII.  Conclusions 
  This study investigates how increasing costs of health insurance have affected wages, 
benefits and hours worked.  We frame these decisions in the context of a model in which firms 
can respond to the large increase in the real price of employer-provided health insurance by 
lowering wages to accommodate the increased costs of benefits, by changing the level of 
benefits, by adjusting hours, or some combination of all three.  Changing income tax rates and 
health insurance prices over time and across states are used to identify the impact of wages and 
benefits on hours worked. 
  The empirical tests are consistent with the theory and generate several useful results.  
Among them:  
  1) The increased cost of health insurance had a substantial effect on the probability that 
firms offer health insurance benefits and on the quality of benefits offered.  The 124% increase 
in the real price of health insurance between 1982 and 1995 lowered the probability of receiving 
employer-provided benefits by 8.4% and induced firms to lower their contribution to health 
insurance benefits by 43%.  However wages are not very sensitive to health insurance costs, 
suggesting that firms did not lower wages to absorb the rising insurance costs. 
  2)  In theory confirmed by the empirical results, firm wage and benefit offers rise as tax 
rates increase, but both benefits and wages proved much more sensitive to marginal tax rates.    25
Marginal income tax rates fell over the sample period.  The net effects of these changing tax 
rates over the sample period were to lower real wages by 19%, to lower the probability of 
receiving benefits by 8%, and to lower the real employer contribution to health insurance by 
50%. 
  3)  Work hours are quite sensitive to the probability of receiving benefits (elasticity of 
0.43) and less sensitive but still significantly affected by the level of those benefits (elasticity of 
0.04).  As a consequence, falling probability of receiving benefits and falling quality of benefits 
offered have caused workers to cut back on hours of work by 4-7%.  Roughly half the effect of 
decreased benefits on work hours is due to income tax rate reform and half to rising costs of 
providing health insurance benefits. 
  4)  Recent studies have indicated that more workers are refusing offered health insurance 
benefits.  The presumption, confirmed in this study, is that firms are cutting back on the 
generosity of benefits in response to rising insurance costs, leading more workers to reject the 
benefits and decrease hours of work as illustrated in Figure 2. 
  5)  Results herein suggest that the recent resumption of double-digit annual increases in 
health insurance costs will lead to further decreases in employer-provision of health insurance 
benefit, cuts in the quality of those benefits, and a decrease in employee take-up of benefits.  
This will almost certainly increase the proportion uninsured.  The latest statistics from the 
Bureau of the Census are consistent with those predictions.   26
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Figure 1:  Alternative compensation packages with and without health insurance benefits:  

















































































































Source:  Authors' compilations of average values for single employees in the Current Population 
Surveys, various years. 
a In constant 1983 dollars.
 
b Based on daily cost of hospitalization reported for the respondent's state and residential population. 
c Proportion of employees receiving firm provided health insurance benefits. 








Table 2:  Employer-provided Health Insurance and Hours Worked Per Week 
  Hours Per Week, 1983-1995 
 1-14  15-24  25-34  35-39  40  41+ 
 













Observations  1982 2337 2790 2935  11546  5972 
Share  (%) 7.1  8.5  10.1 10.6 41.9 21.7 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on sample of single workers from the CPS in 1983, 1987, 1991 
and 1995. 
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Dummy variable indicating employer provides 
health insurance contribution 
ln B  3.69  4.47  Log of one plus the employer health insurance 
contribution 
ln W  2.10  .70  Log of hourly wage last year 
ln (h)  7.46  .59  Log of hours of work last year 
EXP  18.6  8.5  Age—years of education—6 
EDUC  8.3  2.3  Index of education level (from 0:none to 
12:beyond Master's degree) 
FEMALE .43  .50  Female 
BLACK .13  .34  Black 
OTH MINORITY  .04  .20  Other minority groups 
ln (JOB GRO)  .01  .03  Log of state annual employment growth 
ln (AVG EARN)  2.37  .17  Log of state average manufacturing earnings 
UNEMP  6.97  2.34  State unemployment rate 
UNION  .01  .07  Covered by collective bargaining 
ln (CPI)  4.83  .16  Log of the consumer price index 
ln (PLAND)  7.17  .75  Log of state average farmland value 
METRO .84  .37  Metropolitan  residence 
NEAST .30  .46  Northeastern  residence 
WEST .22  .41  Western  residence 
SOUTH .26  .44  Southern  residence 
ln (C
B)  6.5  .41  Log of daily hospital in the state, by metro or 
nonmetro residence 
S t   .03  .02  Average state income tax rate 
t
S  .17  .02  Average sum of state and federal marginal tax 
rate in the state 
CHILD < 6  .05  .25  Number of children under 6 in the home 
NUMBER  1.87  1.3  Number of persons in the home 
ln (V(1-t))  9.7  .31  Log of non-wage income after taxes   32
 
Table 4:  Bootstrap Estimation of the Compensation and Labor Supply Equations 
Variable  ln W  B > 0























**    
 (.001)  (.001)     
EDUC x EXP  -.001
** -.002
**    











 (.011)  (.026)  (.010)  (.014) 





 (.021)  (.038)  (.017)  (.002) 
ln (JOB GRO)  -.093  .751
*    
 (.182)  (.413)     
ln (AVE EARN)  .052  .246
**    
 (.054)  (.097)     
UNEMP .006
* .001     
 (.003)  (.006)     
UNION .089
** .395
**    
 (.04)  (.145)     
ln (CPI)  1.32
** -.336  .217
**  .169
** 
 (.119)  (.22)  (.024)  (.063) 
ln (PLAND)  .018
** .006  .001  -.007 





 (.015)  (.031)  (.010)  (.017) 
NEAST .054
** .009  -.000  -.011 
 (.013)  (.027)  (.01)  (.011) 
WEST .049
** -.133
** -.015  -.013 
 (.015)  (.033)  (.010)  (.016) 
SOUTH .033
** -.047  .028
** .037
** 
 (.016)  (.03)  (.010)  (.012) 
ln (C
B) .006  -.121
*    
 (.034)  (.065)     
S t   .267 .741
*    




**    
 (.354)  (.750)     
CHILD < 6      -.007  -.015 
     (.014)  (.017) 
NUMBER     -.032
** -.047
** 
     (.003)  (.003) 
ln V(1-t)      -.029
** -.022 
     (.013)  (.014) 
B > 0      .419
**  .651
**c 
     (.008)  (.131) 
ln(W(1-t))     -.027
** .109
**c   33
     (.006)  (.047) 
Constant -7.20
** -1.11  6.27
** 6.48
** 
 (.42)  (.89)  (.199)  (.368) 
R
2 .21  .07
b   .04 
Log likelihood    -16724     
Bootstrap Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions based on 27564 single workers for the years 1983, 
1987, 1991, 1995. 
*indicates significance at the .01 level.  
**indicates significance at the .05 level. 
aDummy variable indicating that the firm is providing a health insurance benefit. 
bPseudo-R-square. 
cPredicted value.  34
Table 5:  Simultaneous Estimation of the Compensation and Labor Supply Equations 






















**    
 (.0005)  (.004)     
EDUC x EXP  -.001
** -.009
**    
 (.0002)  (.001)     
FEMALE -.084
** .375
** -.012  -.001 






 (.012)  (.08)  (.010)  (.011) 





  (.019) (.129) (.017)  (.017) 
ln (JOB GRO)  -.076  3.82
**    
 (.19)  (1.24)     
ln (AVE EARN)  .060  .882
**    
 (.049)  (.323)     
UNEMP .007
** .047
**    
 (.003)  (.02)     
UNION .086  .790
**    
 (.054)  (.358)     
ln (CPI)  1.32
** .954 .143
** -.077 
  (.107) (.705) (.024)  (.07) 
ln (PLAND)  .018
** .062  -.002  -.013
** 





  (.014) (.096) (.010)  (.014) 
NEAST .055
** -.026  .006  -.009 
 (.013)  (.09)  (.010)  (.01) 
WEST .049
** -.581
** -.008  -.022 






  (.014) (.097) (.010)  (.016) 
ln (C
B) .005  -.348     
 (.033)  (.214)     
S t   .280 3.10
**    




**    
 (.363)  (2.42)     
CHILD < 6      -.013  -.033
** 
     (.014)  (.015) 
NUMBER     -.033
** -.023
** 
     (.003)  (.004) 
ln (V(1-t))      -.034
** -.117
** 
     (.013)  (.024) 
ln (B)      .045
**  .044
**c 
     (.001)  (.012) 
ln(W(1-t))     -.037
**  .159
**c 




**  8.60   35
 (.42)  (2.80)  (.198)  (.495) 
R
2  .21 .08 .13  .09 
Bootstrap Standard errors in parentheses.  Based on a sample of 27564 single workers over the years 1983, 
1987, 1991, and 1995. 
*indicates significance at the .01 level.  
**indicates significance at the .05 level. 
cInstrumented. 
Correlation Matrix of Residuals 
 ln(W)  ln(B)  ln(h) 
ln(W) 1.0 
ln(B) 0.34  1.0 
ln(h) 0.07 0.32 1.0   
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Endnotes 
 
1 Information provided by Lettau and Buchmueller (1999), and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce (1996). 
 
2 Changes in the real cost of insurance provided by Glied.  Sheu (2001) reports summary 
information on employer-provided health insurance for full-year and part-year workers.  
Note some workers obtain insurance through their employer but pay the full cost of 
insurance is borne by the employee. 
 
3 Gruber (1999) 
 
4 Currie and Madrian (1999) and Gruber (2000) provide comprehensive reviews of this 
literature. 
 
5 Montgomery and Shaw (1997) find an inverse relationship between pensions and wages 
and Gruber (1994) finds an inverse relationship between maternity benefits and wages. 
 
6 To the extent that a husband and wife select their jobs jointly, the treatment of 
husband’s job attributes as exogenous may be suspect.   
  
7 Glied (2003) reports that the pace of health insurance cost increases dropped 
dramatically in the latter half of the 1990s, although costs began increasing again after 
2000. 
 
8 The most common type of privately provided health insurance in the United States is 
hospitalization coverage with almost all coverage tied to paying at least 80% of the 
average cost of a semi-private hospital room in the local area.  We confirmed with a an 
underwriter that these data are used by insurance companies to set state insurance rates 
charged to firms. While providing us cross-sectional variation in insurance costs, our 
hospitalization price series matches national trends quite closely.  Our series rises 124 % 
from 1982 to 1995.  Over that period, the CPI index for hospitalization and physician 
services rose 128% in real terms, while the broadest CPI price index for medical care rose 
124% in real terms.  Consequently, the HIAA data do a good job of tracking the time 
series variation in the cost of providing health care in the economy as a whole. 
   
9 The statistics reported in Table 1 are based on a sample of single workers in the Current 
Population Survey.  Concentration on single workers allows us to avoid confusion caused 
by the potential joint decision on acceptance of employer-provided health insurance in 
two-earner households.  Nevertheless, the time paths of health insurance coverage and 
average employer contributions are similar to those reported in Cutler and Madrian 
(1998) or Sheu (2001). 
 
10 Eventually, the hours supply schedule may bend backward in wages or benefits, but it 
would never pay for the firm to raise compensation to that level. 
   37
 
11 While we view  ) h(•  as an hours of labor supply equation, the story can also be couched 
in terms of the effort exerted by workers.  Montgomery and Shaw (1997) use such an 
efficiency wage formulation to derive firm tradeoffs between wages and pensions. 
 
12 While this appears to be a monopsony-power model in that the firm is incorporating the 
cost of bidding up wages in order to induce additional hours of work, the firm’s overall 
compensation package must meet the competitive level of utility.  Therefore, the firms 
power to set wages is limited to the flexibility to alter the mix of wages, benefits and 
hours, given the market utility constraint. 
 
13 Some have argued that the difference in firm provision of benefits between full- and 
part-time workers is due to fixed costs of providing benefits.  While this may explain part 
of the difference, Lettau and Buchmueller (1999) report large differences between full- 
and part-time workers in firm provision of many types of benefits, even when there are 
no apparent fixed costs to benefit provision.  The strategic use of benefits to create 
convex compensation packages is a likely explanation. 
 
14  Extending health insurance benefits to part-time workers would shift the budget 
constraint upward between 0 and H
* hours worked.  The wage would fall via the 
reservation utility condition.  Consequently, there would be both income and substitution 
effects toward leisure for part-time workers.   
 
15 The measure of education is an index indicating education level rather than years of 
education completed.  The average of 8.3 corresponds to between 13 and 14 years of 
completed schooling. 
 
16 The marginal effects of the variables reported in the text are computed from the probit 






whereβ is the coefficient from column 2,  ) F(•  is 
the cumulative normal distribution function and  ) f(•  is the density function evaluated at 
sample means. 
 
17  Gruber and Lettau (2000) reported elasticity of benefit provision with respect to 
marginal income tax rates of between 0.3 and 0.4, so our estimates appear to be 
consistent with theirs.  Royalty (2000) reports that a unit increase in the marginal income 
tax rate raises probability of receiving benefits by 0.008,  which correspond to an 
estimate of 0.013 in our sample, using the coefficient on the marginal tax rate in column 
2 of Table 4.   
 
18 Examples of papers reporting a positive effect of exogenous benefits on hours worked 
include Scott, Berger and Black (1989), Montgomery and Cosgrove (1983) and Cutler 
and Madrian (1998).  These papers treat the effect as a demand-side response, but their 
estimates are also consistent with our theorized supply-side response. 